

THE TWO GOLDEN RULES OF QUANTUM MECHANICS

SESSION #1



Learning Objectives

- The role of probabilities in quantum mechanics
 - Outcomes are not *necessarily* definite
- The nature of quantum superposition
 - Superposition as a *relative* concept
- Measurement disturbance
 - We can't make two *incompatible* measurements at once
- We can apply these ideas to build technologies
 - Quantum cryptography is based on quantum measurement

Prerequisite Knowledge

- Light is a wave with a **polarization**
 - Crossed polarizers should be familiar
- Light is emitted in units called **photons**
 - Previous encounter with the photoelectric effect
- The Cartesian plane and vector components
 - If advanced, can be taught using formal linear algebra
 - Otherwise, perfectly possible to avoid



Opening Question

What is a quantum measurement?



Mutually Exclusive States

A **quantum measurement** distinguishes between two or more **mutually exclusive states**.


Two states are **mutually exclusive** if being found in one state means it definitely isn't in the other.

The measurement tells us which of the two states our object was in.



Classical Examples




Quantum Examples



Polarization of Light: Wave Picture



$$I_{out} = ||\vec{v}_{out}||^2$$
$$= |\vec{v}_{in} \cdot \vec{v}_a|^2$$




$$I_{out} = I_{in} \cos^2 \theta$$


Malus' Law

The intensity of light that makes it through the analyzer depends on the angle between the analyzer and the light's polarization.

Polarization of Light: Photon Picture



Light is made up of **photons**.
What happens to a
single photon of light
at a polarizer?



Two possibilities:

- 1) The photon passes through the analyzer
- 2) The photon is absorbed

$$\text{Prob}(out) = \cos^2 \theta$$

We must consider the **probability**
of each event occurring

Malus' Law with Photons

A horizontally polarized single photon is incident on a polarizer at angle θ .
What are the probabilities of it being absorbed or transmitted?


	$\theta = 0^\circ$	45°	-45°	-30°	60°	90°	
$\frac{I_{out}}{I_{in}} = \cos^2 \theta$	1	$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{3}{4}$	$\frac{1}{4}$	0	} Wave picture
$Prob(out) = \cos^2 \theta$	1	$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{3}{4}$	$\frac{1}{4}$	0	
$Prob(abs) = \sin^2 \theta$	0	$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{4}$	$\frac{3}{4}$	1	

Mathematically, no difference between wave and photon picture.
But the **interpretation** differs greatly.




Breakout Session

1. Which polarization states are **mutually exclusive**?
2. If a photon makes it through a horizontal polarizer, what can we conclude about its polarization state before and after the polarizer?




Polarization Measurements


The polarizer asks the photons a question, such as:



Are you
 $+45^\circ$ or -45°
polarized?





Are you
horizontally
or vertically
polarized?



Are you
 $+30^\circ$ or -60°
polarized?

A pair of mutually exclusive quantum states is called a **measurement basis**

Asking questions with polarizers




$$\nearrow = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (\rightarrow + \uparrow)$$


50% Probability Transmitted

50% Probability Absorbed

Intuitively, can think about as **vector addition**





Polarization beyond Malus' Law



Two crossed polarizers
No light passes through

Three polarizers
???


Polarization beyond Malus' Law





Three polarizers
???

Superposition and Measurement

One
+45°-polarized photon




$$\nearrow = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (\rightarrow + \uparrow)$$





Superposition and Measurement

If it transmits,
it's definitely
vertical now


Transmits with
50% probability



$$\nearrow = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (\rightarrow + \uparrow)$$






Superposition and Measurement



Transmits again with 50% probability

$$\nearrow = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (\rightarrow + \uparrow)$$

$$\uparrow = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (\nearrow - \searrow)$$




The photon has a 25% chance of making it through
Measurement changes the state!

The Two Golden Rules

Rule #1 Superposition

A photon can behave
as if it is both
“here” and “there”

$$\begin{array}{c} \rightarrow + \uparrow \\ | \text{cat} \rangle + | \text{cat} \rangle \end{array}$$



Wave behaviour


Rule #2

Measurement uncertainty

When asked where it is,
the photon will be found either
“here” or “there”

$$\begin{array}{c} \rightarrow \text{ OR } \uparrow \\ | \text{cat} \rangle \text{ OR } | \text{cat} \rangle \end{array}$$

Particle behaviour



Which of the following states is a superposition state?

A. Horizontal polarization

$$\rightarrow = \frac{\nearrow + \searrow}{\sqrt{2}}$$

B. Vertical polarization

$$\uparrow = \frac{\nearrow - \searrow}{\sqrt{2}}$$

C. +45° diagonal polarization

$$\nearrow = \frac{\rightarrow + \uparrow}{\sqrt{2}}$$

D. None are superposition states

E. All could be superposition states

The Two Golden Rules of Quantum Mechanics

$$\nearrow = \frac{\rightarrow + \uparrow}{\sqrt{2}}$$

$$\searrow = \frac{\rightarrow - \uparrow}{\sqrt{2}}$$

The particle is both
“ \rightarrow ” AND “ \uparrow ”
at the same time

BUT

When measured in the \rightarrow / \uparrow basis,
it will be found as
“ \rightarrow ” OR “ \uparrow ”
randomly

Measurement Basis

Defines which “question”
I ask the particle

Superposition

Always relative to the basis
in which we are measuring

$$\rightarrow = \frac{\nearrow + \searrow}{\sqrt{2}}$$

$$\uparrow = \frac{\nearrow - \searrow}{\sqrt{2}}$$


The particle is both
“ \nearrow ” AND “ \searrow ”
at the same time

BUT

When measured in the \nearrow / \searrow basis,
it will be found as
“ \nearrow ” OR “ \searrow ”
randomly


Summary

- Superposition is a *relative* concept, depending on the *measurement basis* being used
- The act of *measurement* changes the state
- Most quantum measurements are *incompatible*




Polarization and Spin

The three-polarizer experiment is mathematically equivalent to the Stern-Gerlach experiment




Polarized Photons

Spin-Polarized Electrons



Check out the simulation on QuVis!
www.st-andrews.ac.uk/physics/quvis/
“Measurement Uncertainty” Demo



**Question
Break**

Break Time




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
Institute for
Quantum
Computing

QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY




The Science of Secrets

Cryptography




Keys and Security



Alice and Bob use a secure channel to share identical copies of a key

Keys and Security




Keys

- In real life, the key is **information**
- Alice and Bob have the information, but the eavesdropper doesn't



Safe
Key: The PIN Number




Door Lock
Key: Which pins to press

VEJ80F< GV J C3V0JV0, VNEVO
VNDJEY EGOV JE4J<V <7EQ
JBOFRLLJ'V >NFOVNEEJ,
EFJ7780J>F87 F8 >NO JANJFL0
J8J LF<8E>< E8 >NO VEJ80
>FJJ8. F 88EY F> FV J8
087E. LE880FLFJE 7FO88
AJE<8V >NO EFC8 E8 888 8E
8EF8 >NJE F> AJE<8V >NO
E880V E8 J8>V.

Secret Code
Key: Translation back to English

The Caesar Cipher



 = 6 letter shift

 = NKRRU ciphertext

Big Problem!

If you know one encrypted letter,
you know the whole message!

The One-Time Pad (aka Vernam cipher)

A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z
L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K
Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P
M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L
D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C
U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T

A different Caesar cipher for each letter



 = 5 random shifts

 = SUXOI ciphertext

The One-Time Pad




Message 01101000
Key 01001001

Cipher 00100001

Cipher 00100001
Key 01001001

Message 01101000



	Key Bit	
	0	1
Message Bit	0	1
	1	0

Alice and Bob share a long random binary string


Encode and decode by adding mod-2 (XOR)

The One-Time Pad



Message	01101000
Key	01001001
.....	
Cipher	00100001

Cipher	00100001
Key	01001001
.....	
Message	01101000



8-bit key
 2^8 possible keys
Number of possible keys = Number of possible messages

Perfectly secure!
But we're forgetting something...


One-Time Pad Big-Time Problem



Alice





EVE



Bob


How do Alice and Bob securely share the key
in the first place?

Quantum Key Distribution



Alice and Bob generate the key by sending polarization-encoded photons to each other


Quantum Key Distribution



If the eavesdropper intercepts,
they'll disturb the polarization state


The Heart of QKD

Measurement Disturbance









When we measure a quantum state,
we disturb it

The No-Cloning Theorem









FORBIDDEN

Polarization Qubits

	 HV BASIS	 ±45° BASIS
0		
1		


Encode binary “0” or “1” as a polarization state,
with two possible bases

	 H/V measurement	 A/D measurement
	?	?
	?	?
	?	?
	?	?

**Question
Break**

Quantum Key Distribution (QKD)

- QKD uses single-photon signals to establish a **secure secret key**
- Eavesdroppers are detected due to **measurement disturbance**
- Many protocols exist, including some using entanglement
- The most well-known is the Bennett-Brassard (BB84) protocol




Charles Bennett (left), IBM Research
Giles Brassard (right), Université de Montréal

The BB84 Protocol

Step 1
Alice chooses
“0” or “1” randomly

Step 2
Alice chooses the
H/V or $\pm 45^\circ$ basis randomly




“0”
“ $\pm 45^\circ$ ”

Alice’s Lab

Step 7
Repeat and repeat until a long, random binary string is built

Step 8
Estimate the error rate in the string

Step 3
Alice encodes the appropriate qubit
and sends it to Bob as a single photon




Step 6
Alice and Bob publicly announce which bases they used,
keeping their bit values secret

I used the $\pm 45^\circ$
basis

Step 4
Bob randomly chooses
a measurement basis

Step 5
Bob records the result
of his measurement




Bob’s Lab

I used the $\pm 45^\circ$
basis

BB84 Example



1. Alice chooses a **RANDOM** bit
2. Alice chooses a **RANDOM** basis
3. Alice send the state to Bob




4. Bob measures in a **RANDOM** basis
5. Bob records the bit

6. Alice and Bob announce the basis

0	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	1
	R			R			R	R
0	R	1	1	R	0	1	R	R

BB84 Example



Basis Reconciliation

Alice and Bob discard all bits where their bases didn't match

This leaves them with the secret key

01101



What if there's an eavesdropper?


0	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	1
↕	↕	↘	↕	↘	↕	↘	↘	↕
→	↑	↘	↑	↗	→	↘	↗	↑
↕	↘	↘	↕	↕	↕	↘	↕	↘
→	R	↘	↑	R	→	↘	R	R
0	R	1	1	R	0	1	R	R



0	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	1
↕	↕	↘	↕	↘	↕	↘	↘	↕
→	↑	↙	↑	↗	→	↙	↗	↑



↕	↕	↕	↕	↕	↕	↕	↕	↕
→	↑	R	↑	R	→	R	R	↑
0	1	R	1	R	0	R	R	1




↕	↘	↘	↕	↕	↕	↘	↕	↘
→	R	R	↑	R	→	R	R	R
0	R	R	1	R	0	R	R	R



Breakout Session

1. What is the probability that Eve introduces an error for one photon?
2. What is probability that Eve does NOT introduce an error within 100 photons?
3. Why did Alice and Bob need to choose their bases randomly?

Error Estimation & Correction



The presence of Eve unavoidably introduces errors into Alice and Bob's key

By sacrificing some bits to estimate the error, Alice and Bob can either:

Detect the presence of the eavesdropper
OR
Guarantee that no eavesdropper was present

Error Estimation and Correction



Parity Check

See if addition of neighbouring bits matches over the whole string



1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1

“Raw” Key




1 0 1 0

Communicate Publicly

1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1

“Raw” Key



1 0 0 0

x 0 0 x 1 0 x x x x 0 1

Discard sets with errors

&

One bit from each correct set to maintain secrecy

x 0 0 x 1 0 x x x x 0 1

0 0 1 0 0 1

Final Key

0 0 1 0 0 1


Final Key


QKD Common Misconceptions

- We're not sending a message, we're sharing a key
 - The randomness is good!
 - No sensitive information is sent until the key is set
 - If Alice chooses her states non-randomly, Eve can hack

Message	01101000
Key	01001001
Cipher	00100001

- Announcing the bases gives no information about the key
 - They can share that over a public channel





**Question
Break**

Quantum Coins Activity


Instructions on Slack



Group divides into four teams




Alice
Sends
qubits



Bob
Measures
qubits



Eve
Intercepts
qubits



Moderator
Enforces
quantum rules

Model the photon's state as a coin in one of two boxes
Whenever one is measured, the other is shaken

Possible confusion from one quantum state
represented with two objects/boxes

QKD Simulators

Simulation Challenges QuVis

Quantum key distribution (BB84 protocol) with spin $\frac{1}{2}$ particles

Z X
 Random orientations Fixed orientations
 Z X Introduction

Display controls		Alice		Eve		Bob		Alice and Bob	Key
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Show key generation	Basis	Value	Basis	Outcome	Basis	Outcome	Same bases?	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Show key bits	Z	0			X	0	NO	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Show total errors	X	0			X	0	YES	0
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		Z	1			Z	1	YES	1
		X	1			X	1	YES	1
		Z	1			X	1	NO	
		Z	1			X	0	NO	



Clear measurements

Main controls		Most recent key bits (same bases)		Errors (all measurements)	
		Alice	Bob	Theoretical	
Send spin $\frac{1}{2}$ particles to Bob		0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0	0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0	Total:	$N_{\text{tot}} = 807$
<input type="button" value="Single particle"/>	<input type="button" value="Continuous"/>	1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1	1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1	Key bits:	$N_{\text{key}} = 403$ $0.5 N_{\text{tot}}$
<input type="button" value="Fast forward 100 particles"/>		1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1	1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1	Errors:	$N_{\text{err}} = 0$ 0
Let Eve intercept and resend particles		0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1	0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1	Probability:	$\frac{N_{\text{err}}}{N_{\text{key}}} = 0.000$ 0
<input type="button" value="Eavesdrop!"/>		<input type="button" value="Let Alice & Bob compare 20 bits for errors"/>			

Simulator from QuVis (St. Andrew's University)



Uses electron spin rather than polarization

QKD Laser Activity





EDU-QCRY1
\$3,547 USD

THORLABS
Discovery



LASER RADIATION
DO NOT STARE INTO BEAM
CLASS 2 LASER PRODUCT



Homebuilt version
w/ 3D-printed models
~\$150 USD
Student test groups needed!




Superposition, Measurement, and Quantum Cryptography

Applications & Technology




Hacking QKD

QKD security is guaranteed by the laws of physics!
But compromised by the reality of engineering



Sending Photons over Long Distances

Optical fibre




Free-space / Satellites



Quantum Random-Number Generators

101100100101110110010011100000111110111010101010101100001011111000000011110000000111101110010

- Most computers generate “pseudo” random numbers
 - The sequence looks random enough, but is perfectly predictable
- Quantum mechanics is *truly* random
 - The sequence is unpredictable, even if we know the quantum states



idQuantique QRNG

Summary

- Quantum systems can carry **information**
- Measurement in one **basis** disturbs the other
- These ideas can be used for **information security**

Thanks for joining!

The next session will be tomorrow at 7pm ET on
Wave-Particle Duality and Quantum Computing

Lingering questions?
Please ask on the #quantum-questions channel